Zinedine Zidane’s Real Madrid (2016/17 season)
Introduction
Arguably one of the most successful Real Madrid sides in history, the 2016/17 season under Zinedine Zidane was incredible. From a silverware point of view, they were phenomenal winning the
- Champions League
- La Liga
- Super Cup
- Club World Cup
These were and still are huge achievements, because Los Blancos won two Champions Leagues (their 11th and 12th) in a row which is a feat that is yet to be repeated by any side. He also won them their 33rd La Liga trophy, a trophy that they had not won in four years.
Despite only winning the league by three points, Zidane’s side was not only one of the best in Spain, but also in Europe. Tactically they were brilliant and many of the players were in career best form, like Cristiano Ronaldo, who won the Ballon D’Or in 2016 and 2017.
In this report I will be detailing many key areas of Zidane’s system, as well as some other key points that made up their season including:
• Starting Eleven
• Defensive Phase
• Attacking Phase
• Weaknesses
• Certain player qualities
Starting Eleven
As usual, Zidane set his side up in a 4–3–3 system however he would change to a 4–4–2 diamond if there were injuries or he favoured a different personnel in certain games, and this depended on whether Isco was starting or not.
Gareth Bale, unfortunately, was injured for periods of the 2016/17 season, but when he was fit, he started games and Zidane would go with the 4–3–3:
Navas
Marcelo — Varane — Ramos — Carvajal
Kroos — Casemiro — Modrić
Ronaldo — Benzema — Bale
When Bale was injured, Zidane would shift the shape to the 4–4–2 diamond (or a 4–3–1–2):
Navas
Marcelo — Varane — Ramos — Carvajal
Kroos — Casemiro — Modrić
Isco
Ronaldo — Benzema
Regardless of system or personnel, Real Madrid were more offensive this season than the season before. It could be argued that Zidane placed a greater emphasis on playing attacking football from pre-season, where he could work with the players on his ideas in more detail, rather than midway through a season.
Defensive Phase
Due to Madrid choosing to be more offensive, they wanted to win the ball back much quicker than they did last season (15/16). In that season, their pressing was light in the opposition’s half, as they waited for the opponents to come into their half and press them intensely there.
However this season, Zidane tasked the players to press in more advanced positions, much more frequently than last season. The structure was rather conventional, with the three forwards pressing the opposition’s defenders and the three midfielders pressing the opposition’s midfielders.
Los Blancos would also have a high defensive line, as they wanted to constrict play in the opposition’s half, but should a counter attack happen, all four defenders were relatively quick on the recovery, so they could afford to hold the defensive line at the halfway line.
The moment the opposition reach Real Madrid’s half, there is a structural change (similar to Ancelloti’s 13/14 Real Madrid) where the players shift into a 4–4–2 shape, with Ronaldo and Benzema leading the line. Casemiro, like last season, would be slightly deeper in the pivot, by stopping any playmaker taking advantage of the space between Real Madrid’s midfielders and defenders.
On the right hand side, Madrid would defend as normal with Carvajal and Bale occupying that area. However, as Ronaldo had now pushed up next to Benzema, a slight adjustment would be needed. Should the ball reach Ronaldo’s side, the centre midfielder who is closest to this side (normally Modrić) would cover for the Portuguese, and he would defend that side, along with Marcelo.
A noticeable change from last season (15/16) where Ronaldo would return and drop in with the midfield by creating a five in midfield. Yet, this season Ronaldo’s defensive responsibilities have been limited, as Zidane values Ronaldo’s efficiency when he’s on the ball.
This measure of conserving star player’s energy while defending is also present within Luis Enrique’s era at Barcelona, with his roles for Messi, Neymar and Suárez. This would also allow for Ronaldo to be more productive the moment Madrid gain possession of the ball, as like Barcelona, Zidane would want Ronaldo to utilise his speed when he’s got energy for a counter attack.
On a different note, Ronaldo’s pressing is more prevalent when Madrid lose the ball outside the opposition’s box. Should a player lose the ball in this area, the players closest to the opponent with the ball would surround him, cutting his passing options and thus looking to win the ball back as soon as possible.
The team’s ability to have that balance between being proactive and reactive, gives them that edge when it comes to keeping possession.
The common rule with gegenpressing, is to win the ball back within a certain time period. Some believe 6 seconds is the optimum time period, others believe 8. With Real Madrid, they counter press for 6 seconds and if the opposition still retains possession, then they’ll return into their shape.
This is another reason why Madrid chose to defend with a high line, as it allows the defenders less ground to cover in order to counter press quickly and aggressively. This is often why they do not concede goals on the transition to the defensive phase.
Set pieces are key elements to Zidane’s gameplan, and he believes that the team in order to be successful, needs to be the best at both defending and attacking set pieces. Defensively, they have a clear structure.
With corners, they use man-orientations, where every player in the box (bar those marking in a zone) is marking an opposition player. Only Ronaldo or Benzema are defending zonally, where Ronaldo is marking the edge of the penalty box while Benzema is marking the front post. Their role is to act as a sweeper, to defend against any opponent who’s managed to escape from his marker.
There would also be one player who is usually close to the corner taker, if the potential situation of a short corner arose. There would also be two players on the edge of the box to deal with scraps, or to win the ball back and counter attack.
With free kicks, it’s a similar story. They use man-orientations while defending here too. Normally one or two players in the wall, should the free kick be in a wide area and the rest of the defenders/midfielders are marking players.
Attacking Phase
Like last season, Zidane’s favoured method of chance creation was wide play and crosses into the box. But this season, the manager wanted to take Madrid to another level. The players were flexible with attacking via any method. This made them extremely difficult to defend against.
On the transition to the attacking phase, Zidane instructed the players to counter attack, just like the Madrid of old under Mourinho and Ancelloti. Last season, Zidane wasn’t too fussed about counter attacks, but as he wanted the players to be the best in every situation, he adjusted his game plan in order to do so.
In the 2016/17 season, Madrid were arguably the best counter attacking team in the world. Usually in the counter attack, the three forwards of Ronaldo, Benzema, Bale/Isco would sprint at speed for the attack. In some situations, one, two or maybe even three players would also go with the three forwards.
These counter attacks are usually successful, due to the opposition’s inability to be organised quickly. The Real Madrid attackers are at times, one or two seconds ahead in terms of decision making than the defenders, as shown above.
The counter attacks are more effective however when a player like Toni Kroos or Luka Modrić is advancing with the ball or joining in with the attacks. This is due to the creative ability of the two, where their playmaking ability makes it even more difficult for the opposition to defend against.
The image from above was a result of a Kroos pass that split the lines of the Barcelona defence. But the problem is, both Modrić and Kroos can’t rush forward in every counter attack, due to the amount of energy they would lose.
So, on the occasions when Zidane would start Isco (mostly as a forward), he would be the one to rush forward with the counter attack. His creative ability in that season was just as good as both Modrić and Kroos. Most of the time, the counter attack would look like Isco driving at the opposition with Ronaldo and Benzema ahead of him.
These counter attacks are at their deadliest when Madrid are playing an opposition that commits many numbers in their attacking phase. They leave lots of space in behind and are often not quick enough to deal with players like Isco, Ronaldo, Benzema or Bale.
However, there will be situations when the opposition manage to return to their defensive positions before Madrid are able to counter attack. From here, Los Blancos are happy to begin with their patient build up play.
Like last season, Modrić and Kroos were integral to Real Madrid’s build up play, due to their playmaking ability. Also like last season, Casemiro would not help as much with the build up play, so he gets into deeper positions to give space to Modrić and Kroos.
In most instances, Kroos would build up play on the left side, typically in the left half space and Modrić on the right hand side, also in the right half space. This is to take full advantage of the horizontal and vertical positioning on a pitch, giving Madrid options in as many areas as possible.
Zidane wants his players to build up mostly with short and patient passes. But if the team is in need of a goal OR the opportunity arises, like last season, Real Madrid had two ways of reaching an area close to the opposition’s penalty box.
The first one is getting one of the three forwards (Ronaldo, Benzema, Bale or Isco) to drop deep and link up with the midfielders or defenders, as well as the players in more advanced positions.
The player that would drop deep the most would be Isco. When he starts, Isco would typically play as a conventional number 10, that is constantly looking to move and receive in any angle/position.
The second method was a long ball to the forwards. The aerial ability of Ronaldo, Benzema and Bale helped with this method massively, as they could either bring the ball to ground or flick it on to the advantage of a rushing midfielder or fullback. Sometimes, there would be opportunities for long balls into space.
The long ball method was favoured more when the opposition would choose to press high. This was a risky and often dangerous method for the opposition, as space would be left in behind for players like Ronaldo and Bale to take advantage of. This flexibility in build up was a massive weapon for Zidane.
When Real Madrid are playing against an opposition that likes to defend with many players behind the ball, switches of play, short passes, movement and a high tempo is what’s expected from a Zidane side.
Los Blancos looked to switch play continuously, as this method tested the opposition’s concentration and focus, as this would inevitably create space (usually in the half spaces) for a midfielder or forward to take advantage of). This is another reason why Madrid would have their players positioned high and wide.
Dani Carvajal and Marcelo would usually get high and wide, allowing the forwards in Ronaldo, Benzema and Bale to play in the half spaces. They play an important role against these oppositions, as they look to combine out wide with an attacker or a midfielder.
Whether the opposition chose to defend passively or aggressively, the constant switch of play and change in angles created problems for the opposition and their shape. Sometimes, a long ball out wide to a fullback (usually the pass would be completed by either Kroos or Modrić) to exploit the compactness of the opposition’s shape.
These long, horizontal passes make switching play more effective, as it is a quicker method and stretches the opposition’s shape quicker. This method was frequent, especially against low blocks, due to the passing range of both Kroos and Modrić. Marcelo and Carvajal were also able to receive these balls in space, and they were often given time and freedom to advance with the ball out wide.
Often, the forwards or at times the midfielders would make runs into the half spaces. This is due to the space that is created there (specifically the space between a wide player and a central player i.e. a fullback and a centre back).
The fullbacks weren’t just restricted to overlap runs, although it was more common. To create more flexibility in attack, there would be situations where the fullback would make an inverted run, into the same area that would be targeted by a forward/midfielder.
Like last season when it came to crossing the ball, it would normally be the same structure, of a fullback or a forward (either of the three) delivering the cross to two forwards who are waiting for the ball. The crossing definitely improved this season from all players, and this allowed for more goals to be scored from out wide.
Kroos and Modrić wouldn’t enter the box as often, as they needed to create play from deeper areas, and also if Madrid needed to continue to switch the play, they would already be there, ready to switch. This is a change from last season, as either of the midfielders would cover out wide, should an attacker not be there.
But this created more of a dependence on both fullbacks in Marcelo and Carvajal. They would often be alone out wide, ready to cross the ball into the box to the three forwards. This is especially the case, when Isco starts, as he is rarely receiving the ball out wide.
However, if the wingers were with the fullbacks out wide, they were given more freedom this season to cut inside, dribble, link up with attackers or have a shot. Ronaldo and Bale were given more freedom to perform these actions this season.
If Isco was to receive out wide, he would normally go to the left as that way he could dribble inside and have a shot on his stronger foot (his right).
If Ronaldo went wide and cut inside, well, you know what’s next.
Just like the season before, many of Real Madrid’s offensive players had a good technique that allowed them to shoot from outside the box. Two of Real Madrid’s goals in the 2017 Champions League Final against Juventus were scored from outside the box.
With set pieces just like last season, Real Madrid were elite in this area as well. With corners, roughly three or four Real Madrid players, who would be mainly trying to score directly from the corner, would be close to each other in order to provide an easy target for the player crossing.
- Of the four, Ramos would normally be the deepest player so that he does not get marked, where he’d suddenly rush at speed towards the cross.
- The hope is for the opposition markers to not notice Ramos’ deep runs, as they’re preoccupied with the other players.
One player not involved, would rush quickly in a different direction from his teammates to escape his marker.
- Normally, he would sprint towards the player crossing to reach the ball first (either to score or flick the ball on).
- This player could be anyone, which added an element of surprise for the opposition when it came to marking.
With free kicks, roughly two or three Real Madrid players begin in offside positions, so that they aren’t marked by the opposition due to the defenders looking to play an offside trap. Then, directly before the cross is made, the players not in offside positions would rush forward, forcing their markers to go with them.
The objective here is to make those initial players not offside anymore. From there, they should be free and unmarked to receive the ball.
Weaknesses
Madrid’s tactics were not perfect. There were weak points, just like every elite team before and after them.
Marcelo and Carvajal’s advanced positions when attacking would leave spaces in behind. This meant that the counter press had to be spot on, and the players had to win their individual 1v1s. Otherwise, the backline would be left exposed to a counter attack out wide. Fortunately, Varane and Ramos were able to cover well in wide areas, yet at times they would not be able to.
Zidane understood that the opposition’s main method of breaking down his side would be through counter attacks. Rather than be negative and restrict the space that Marcelo and Carvajal are able to exploit, he adopted a mindset that was prevalent with Sir Alex Ferguson, which was to just score more than the opposition.
This is what made Madrid such a good side. Even if the opposition was to score, Zidane had full faith in the players to always score, no matter what the situation was. There was no match in the 2016/17 season where Real Madrid failed to score a goal.
Another weakness, but one that could be fixed, was the opposition scoring from set pieces. As Los Blancos would utilise a man-oriented marking system, there were times when the opponents were able to escape from their markers and score. This can be fixed by implementing a mix of zonal and man-oriented marking systems.
Isco
A final point before the conclusion, Isco’s role in the 2016/17 season was interesting.
Bale being injured for large parts of the season meant that Zidane had to adjust the game plan slightly. When Bale would play, he would provide pace, power and width out wide, where he could contribute for and from a cross.
Isco clearly was a different player, as because he operated as a 10 in the 4–4–2 diamond, he would position himself mostly behind the two strikers or in between the lines, to play in either Ronaldo or Benzema. Isco began to be favoured more, as Zidane felt that pace wasn’t a crucial aspect when he had Ronaldo, and width either, as Marcelo and Carvajal could do the job by themselves.
Conclusion
This Real Madrid side was complete in every facet from a tactical viewpoint. They could attack very well and defensively they were strong. It’s no surprise in the end that Los Blancos finished the season with four trophies won, including La Liga and the Champions League.
