The Best Statistical Choice To Be The Next Manchester United Manager

I recently read an interesting analytical piece from Carteret Analytics, a prominent group specialising in quantitative data analysis across various sectors, including retail, industrials, professional services, and elite sports.

Given their pedigree concerning their statistical analysis methodology, the group has gained recognition for its collaboration with notable outlets such as the UK newspaper The Sun. In this partnership, they have applied their expertise to statistically assess prospective managers for top football clubs, providing a data-driven lens through which to evaluate coaching talent.

For instance, a few months ago, they published an article that meticulously analysed potential candidates to succeed Jürgen Klopp, following his departure from Liverpool at the end of last season. This piece not only highlighted the candidates’ qualifications and statistics but also offered a broader perspective on the strategic implications of each choice for the club’s future.

Recently, Carteret Analytics conducted an extensive review of potential managers to replace Erik ten Hag, who has been under increasing scrutiny at Manchester United. While we’ve explored various candidates for the Dutchman’s position on this platform, none have been analysed with the same level of detail as Carteret Analytics provides.

The review, authored by Henry Powell, began by meticulously assessing the objective performance levels of a range of head coaches. This involved gathering quantitative ratings and metrics that highlight each candidate’s strengths and weaknesses over the past few seasons.

The selection process for these managers intentionally included a diverse mix of both established and emerging figures in the football landscape. By broadening the field, the report aimed to create a broader comparison, offering insights that transcend traditional assessments of managerial aptitude.

However, it’s important to note that the article does not explicitly outline the methodologies employed to calculate or obtain the data. This omission necessitates a degree of caution when interpreting the report, as it won’t provide a definitive measure of who would be the most suitable candidate to succeed Erik ten Hag at United.

But for the sake of discussion, we will engage with their metrics and draw our own conclusions, utilising this analytical framework as a springboard for deeper exploration into the potential future of Manchester United’s managerial position.

To begin their analysis, Carteret Analytics reviewed the achievements and progress of several notable managers over the past six years, including Ruben Amorim, Zinedine Zidane, Simone Inzaghi, Thomas Tuchel, Kieran McKenna, Ruud van Nistelrooy, Erik ten Hag, Gareth Southgate, Graham Potter, Michael Carrick, Roberto De Zerbi, and Thomas Frank.

From there, the team focused on determining each manager’s “Football Intelligence,” a metric measured through the combination of two key factors: Strategic Intelligence and Tactical Command. While these aspects of management might typically be seen as qualitative, Carteret Analytics provided specific parameters for both, offering insight into how they quantified this metric for each manager.

Tactical Command was defined as a manager’s ability to impact and transform a match, particularly in terms of shifting the probability of winning from various match scenarios. This metric emphasises Key Match Events (KMEs) — moments in a game that lead to, or could lead to, goals scored or conceded. Tactical Command essentially measures a manager’s influence over these critical events and how they can transform the outcome of a match. The higher the per-match rating, the stronger the Tactical Command.

Strategic Intelligence focuses on a manager’s ability to prepare their team and analyse the opposition effectively, with the goal of maximising the probability of winning the next match. This includes the manager’s understanding of player performance, form, positioning, and how formations interact with both their own team and the opposition. A higher Strategic Intelligence score reflects a manager’s ability to adapt and optimise both their team’s strengths and their response to the opponent’s tactics over a season.

According to the report, Erik ten Hag performed poorly in both areas, with “very mediocre ratings for Strategic Intelligence (52.63) and Tactical Command (3.24).” While the methodology for assigning these precise figures remains somewhat unclear, the findings align with criticisms often levelled against ten Hag this season, particularly his tactical rigidity.

Manchester United has struggled with maintaining effective possession, with their success mostly stemming from quick offensive transitions. However, as noted, excelling in this area alone does not necessarily equate to a well-rounded tactical strategy, especially when faced with stronger opponents where possession and control become more critical.

What stands out immediately from the analysis is that Ruben Amorim, the manager of Sporting CP, emerges as the best-performing candidate in terms of Football Intelligence, boasting an impressive Strategic Intelligence rating of 88.24 and a Tactical Command rating of 6.5. While the debate may continue over whether he is the most tactically astute among the candidates listed, there is no denying that he possesses an impressive tactical acumen that has led to significant success.

Amorim is particularly known for his effective use of the 3–4–3 formation, which has transformed Sporting into a formidable force in both the Primeira Liga and in Europe. His ability to blend attacking flair with solid defensive organisation has been crucial in his team’s consistent high-level performances. During his tenure, Sporting secured the league title twice and the Portuguese League Cup on two occasions, solidifying his reputation as a tactician capable of delivering results.

Equally intriguing are the performances of Kieran McKenna and Simone Inzaghi, who also received commendable ratings for Tactical Command and Strategic Intelligence, respectively. McKenna has consistently impressed with his work at Ipswich Town, where his tactical adaptability and innovative game strategies have revitalised the team. His ability to read matches and make real-time adjustments has contributed to Ipswich’s strong performances, particularly as they made their return to the Premier League this season.

Inzaghi, on the other hand, has showcased his mastery of an effective gameplan, particularly in high-stakes situations against tough opponents. His strategic prowess was on full display during his tactical battles against Manchester City in the Champions League this season, where he expertly crafted game plans that maximised his team’s strengths while neutralising the threats posed by his opponents. Both McKenna and Inzaghi exemplify the blend of tactical flexibility and strategic insight that is essential for success at the highest levels of football.

Moving on to the next category, Carteret Analytics measured a manager’s ability to coach an effective attacking side by analysing both the team’s Attacking Coefficient and Success-Adjusted Attacking Coefficient. This metric was deemed crucial, particularly for Manchester United, where an attacking philosophy is deeply ingrained in the club’s tradition

For any prospective manager to thrive at Old Trafford, having a high-level approach to attacking football is essential. The average Attacking Coefficient was established at 21.51, with Erik ten Hag’s score of 20.24 falling below this benchmark.

Part of ten Hag’s underperformance in this area was attributed to his consistent use of the 4–2–3–1 system. In contrast, managers who ranked more highly, such as Ruben Amorim (25.71), Zinedine Zidane (25.73), and Gareth Southgate (25.06), tended to favour more expansive systems like the 3–4–3 or 4–3–3, which allow for greater attacking fluidity. While this suggests that certain formations may promote more effective attacking football, the reality is more complex.

Relying solely on formation to assess a team’s attacking capability is a somewhat simplistic approach. Formations merely serve as structural guidelines and do not necessarily indicate how effectively a team attacks or defends. The underlying principles — such as how players interpret space, make off-the-ball runs, and transition from defence to attack — are far better indicators of a team’s offensive prowess. The tactical philosophy and the individual roles within the system often dictate whether a formation succeeds or fails in creating goal-scoring opportunities.

This complexity is illustrated by Simone Inzaghi’s case. While his Attacking Coefficient (17.24) is below average, he ranks sixth in the Success-Adjusted Attacking Coefficient (14.22). At first glance, this might seem contradictory, especially considering that Inter Milan scored 89 goals in Serie A last season, the highest in the league by a considerable margin (AC Milan, in second, scored 76 goals).

What this discrepancy highlights is that a team’s raw attacking output doesn’t always correlate directly with the Attacking Coefficient as calculated by Carteret Analytics. Inzaghi’s system is a little more unique in the sense of how they move the ball and transition quickly, which allows Inter to succeed even without achieving a higher Attacking Coefficient. The Success-Adjusted Attacking Coefficient perhaps reflects how well his tactical planning converts into tangible outcomes over time, despite lower ratings in attacking fluidity or dominance measured by the base coefficient.

Moving on to shot conversion, Carteret Analytics places significant importance on this metric, emphasising the value of maintaining a high Shot Conversion Rating (SCR) while keeping an opponent’s Opposition Shot Conversion Rating (OSCR) low. These metrics help gauge a manager’s effectiveness in both maximising offensive opportunities and minimising defensive vulnerabilities.

According to the graph, managers like Ruben Amorim (45.88), Gareth Southgate (44.52), Simone Inzaghi (42.8), and Zinedine Zidane (41.59) lead the pack with strong Shot Conversion Ratings. This is not entirely surprising, especially for Southgate and Zidane, given the wealth of attacking talent they’ve had at their disposal during their managerial stints. Working with world-class players tends to elevate a team’s offensive efficiency, as seen in their ability to convert shots into goals consistently.

Erik ten Hag, on the other hand, posts a significantly lower Shot Conversion Rating of 31.4, reflecting Manchester United’s ongoing struggles to turn their offensive chances into goals. Despite United often generating a high expected goals (xG) figure throughout a season, their failure to convert consistently has become a well-documented issue. Players like Rasmus Højlund and Joshua Zirkzee, brought in to solve United’s scoring problems, have yet to deliver on their potential, compounding the pressure on ten Hag to find solutions.

On the defensive side, ten Hag’s Opposition Shot Conversion Rating (28.97) suggests that while United aren’t the worst defensively, they’re far from efficient.

While the Red Devils haven’t necessarily been shipping a large number of goals, they’ve conceded an alarming volume of shots, which has left them relying heavily on André Onana’s goalkeeping heroics or, at times, luck with opposition finishing. This imbalance underscores United’s frailty, especially when the opposition is able to take advantage of the spaces ten Hag’s system continuously leaves open.

Adding to these concerns, ten Hag also shares the lowest Shot Creation Ratio (SCR) with Brentford manager Thomas Frank, both coming in at a ratio of 0.92:1. This ratio compares a team’s shots on goal to those of their opponents, and a sub-1.0 rating highlights that United are often outshot by their rivals. Such a figure aligns with the broader narrative that ten Hag’s team is struggling not only to dominate offensively but also to contain their opponents effectively.

In contrast, Simone Inzaghi shines in this category, boasting both a high Shot Conversion Rating (42.8) and an outstanding Opposition Shot Conversion Rating (20.83). This dual success is emblematic of Inzaghi’s tactical emphasis on solid defensive structures and lethal counterattacks.

His Inter Milan side is renowned for their effectiveness in transition, where they create higher-quality chances, a key factor behind their superior conversion rate. Inzaghi’s tactical philosophy, which centres on efficient transitions and exploiting opposition weaknesses, has undoubtedly contributed to Inter’s ability to score from fewer shots while stifling their opponents’ chances.

In the final metric, Carteret Analytics assessed managers based on their ability to convert goals and create Key Match Events (KMEs) from possession. While possession alone doesn’t purely correlate with success, it serves as an indicator of a team’s ability to control games, particularly in high-level football.

Erik ten Hag’s Manchester United side has struggled in this regard, especially in away matches, where their inability to control possession effectively has contributed to their underwhelming away record. Despite showing moments of tactical fluidity, ten Hag’s team hasn’t consistently turned possession into a decisive advantage, both in terms of KMEs and goal conversion.

Interestingly, while Ruben Amorim ranks highly across most metrics, his Possession KME Creation in home matches (11.48) is actually slightly below ten Hag’s (11.59). This suggests that ten Hag’s United are capable of creating important moments from possession at home, albeit marginally better than Amorim’s Sporting CP.

However, when it comes to converting these KMEs into goals, Amorim’s efficiency outshines ten Hag’s, with Sporting converting at 5.55 compared to United’s far lower 3.22. This underscores a recurring issue for United under ten Hag — creating chances but struggling to capitalise on them.

In away matches, ten Hag performs slightly better, with a Possession Goal Conversion of 2.96 and a KME Creation of 8.64. This shows that with approximately 47% possession in away games, United are at least able to have a modestly positive impact on the attack, despite not dominating possession. Still, their inability to finish chances remains a persistent problem, compounded by their issues in controlling games against stronger opposition on the road.

Ten Hag also ranks near the bottom in terms of Overall Possession, second to last just ahead of Thomas Frank. Although possession stats alone don’t dictate success, teams that tend to control possession are generally expected to dominate proceedings. Manchester United’s low possession numbers suggest a deeper problem, not just in ten Hag’s system but in how effectively the players execute his instructions, especially away from Old Trafford.

The example of Roberto De Zerbi provides a useful contrast. De Zerbi’s Brighton team maintained a high possession rate during his tenure there (60% both home and away), yet his team underperformed in both Possession Goal Conversion and Possession KME Creation, showing that high possession alone does not guarantee results. This also highlights a similar issue for ten Hag: while his team can create chances from possession, the conversion of those chances into goals is where they consistently fall short.

To conclude, Carteret Analytics’ evaluation of potential candidates to replace Erik ten Hag presents a clear top four: Ruben Amorim, Zinedine Zidane, Simone Inzaghi, and Thomas Tuchel.

The rankings are based on key performance markers such as Strategic Intelligence, Tactical Command, Attacking Coefficient, and various possession-based metrics.

1. Ruben Amorim is highlighted as the best candidate, with the highest Strategic Intelligence (88.24) and Tactical Command (6.5), as well as a top-tier Attacking Coefficient (25.71). His success with Sporting CP, using a well-structured 3–4–3 system, makes him an attractive option for Manchester United’s desire to return to an attacking brand of football.
2. Zinedine Zidane ranks second, largely due to his proven track record at Real Madrid, where his high Attacking Coefficient (25.73) and ability to handle top-level players successfully contributed to multiple Champions League titles.
3. Simone Inzaghi comes in third, praised for his high Strategic Intelligence Rating (82.46) and balance between offensive and defensive organisation. His ability to craft effective game plans, particularly in high-stakes matches, adds to his appeal.
4. Thomas Tuchel, despite being ranked fourth, brings strong credentials. His flexibility in tactics and success at Chelsea, including a Champions League win, make him a viable candidate, especially since he is currently available for a potential managerial shift.

While Carteret Analytics provides a detailed and data-driven analysis, the limitations of this model must be acknowledged. The methodology behind the ranking system raises questions about the generalisability and reliability of the findings. Different managers have had access to varying levels of talent and have competed in leagues with differing levels of difficulty, which introduces confounding variables that may skew the results.

In my view, the report highlighted several strong candidates who have been linked with the Manchester United job recently, each with compelling qualities.

• Ruben Amorim is a fascinating option. His success at Sporting CP and his tactical intelligence, especially with his 3–4–3 system, mark him as a rising star in European football. That being said, I have reservations about whether he’s fully prepared to handle the immense pressure of a club like Manchester United, which is currently in a challenging position. The leap from a club like Sporting to United is massive, and while he has high potential, I’m not sure he’s ready for that step yet.
• Zinedine Zidane is a name I’ve covered extensively, and while I would love to see him take the reins at Old Trafford, I don’t believe it’s a realistic option in the near future. Zidane has typically been linked with jobs at clubs where he has a strong emotional connection, and there hasn’t been much concrete evidence to suggest he’s interested in the United job.
• Simone Inzaghi offers a unique tactical approach, particularly with his well-organised 3–5–2 system, which has brought him success at Inter. I think he’d be an exciting choice if United were looking to make a significant shift in both tactical style and squad-building philosophy. However, his lack of fluency in English and questions about how his system would suit United’s current squad create potential hurdles.
• Thomas Tuchel remains, in my opinion, the strongest candidate. His tactical flexibility, success at major clubs and his availability make him an ideal option at this point in time. Tuchel’s ability to adapt his game plan based on opposition, as well as his experience managing elite talent, is crucial for a club like Manchester United, especially in its current state.

Ultimately, while Amorim is an exciting long-term option and Inzaghi presents an intriguing tactical proposition, I believe Tuchel is the safest and most logical choice for United right now. He has the proven pedigree and is readily available, making him a strong contender to replace Erik ten Hag.