Perth Glory vs Melbourne City (Tactical Analysis)

James Renton
11 min readJul 18, 2022
(Photo by Will Russell/Getty Images)

It had been a dark season for the Perth Glory Football Club but the shining light at the end of the tunnel was seen in the final game of the season against Melbourne City at HBF Park.

Many came into this game feeling quite deflated, bruised and battered.

The Glory were rock bottom, with a host of senior players unavailable while Melbourne City were on the charge to yet another Premier’s Plate.

Yet, the game was won in extraordinary fashion by the home side, 2–0.

Callum Timmins scored two wonder goals from the edge of the box in both halves which were enough for the Glory against the 2020/21 champions.

I had been rather skeptical of Ruben Zadkovich’s appointment as the then interim coach of Perth Glory, and I still am, however in that game it was clear he coached the side in a terrific manner to ensure the win was achieved.

(image source: IMAGO/AAP)

Despite City’s domination, the Glory’s defensive steel and you could argue luck in front of goal, was the difference in the end.

So how exactly did both teams go about their business?

Starting Lineups

Perth Glory’s lineup (source: Paramount+)

For some weird reason, Paramount+ lined Perth Glory out in a 3–4–3 system when in actuality it was a 4–4–1–1/4–4–2 shape. Reason being, the Glory had to be compact vertically and laterally, hence the utilisation of two banks of four.

Melbourne City’s lineup (source: Paramount+)

Again like with how Paramount+ lined Perth out, it was the same for City. The away side lined up in a 4–2–3–1, with Marco Tillio operating as the attacking midfielder ahead of Rostyn Griffiths and Connor Metcalfe.

Statistics

Major Statistics (source: FotMob)

To no real surprise, Melbourne City dominated possession as the Glory were content just sitting off and allowing City to try and pick them apart.

The xG statistic was also not that much of a surprise, as despite Perth scoring two goals, both of them were taken from locations where it was not as likely to score.

The evidence that the Glory’s defence was very strong was through the amount of shots off target Melbourne City had.

Of the 25 shots, 15 were off target which doesn’t just tell me City were incredibly inaccurate with their shots but more importantly, the Perth defenders did just enough to protect their goal.

Summary

It was clear to see that the Glory were content with defending in a low or medium block, as the objective was to limit the possibility of City being able to penetrate vertically through the block.

City’s build-up shape in possession

City’s intriguing 3–1 build-up shape in possession was rather unique, however it would allow them to have a solid rest-defence structure as well as having five players in the attacking third.

The benefit of attacking with 5 allows for players to be occupied in the wide areas, half-spaces and the central zones.

Within 25 seconds of the game starting, City were able to get their first sight of goal through Jamieson’s switch of play to Andrew Nabbout.

Perth did not defend the half-spaces well during the game, as Maclaren was able to make a run on the blindside of Darryl Lachman to get in behind and test Liam Reddy.

Maclaren exploiting the space in behind

Fortunately, Liam Reddy was able to make the save and Perth were able to regain possession. However, City’s counterpress was very difficult to bypass as the Glory held onto the ball for only 6 seconds.

This was to be expected as City were ranked number one in the competition for possession regained in the final third per 90 minutes (6.6).

It was very difficult for the Glory to progress the ball in their defensive third and that was due to City’s defensive structure.

Despite Glory defender and Curaçao international Darryl Lachman boasting a very good range of passing, he struggled to progress the ball through City’s first phase of pressure.

Patrick Kisnorbo instructed his forwards to act as a screen to ensure the Glory defenders could not make the easy pass to one of the central midfielders.

Given the initial positioning of both Malik and Timmins was quite square and there were a lack of rotations in the midfield, it was relatively easy for City.

City’s pressing structure

The evidence that going through the middle was not a favourable option was seen through the lack of passing angles created to progress the ball to the midfielders, denying potential passing lanes due to passive movements and slow ball progression in the first phase.

Glory weren’t a side that played the ball through the middle which was frustrating at times as it led to predictable patterns of play.

This was evident through the attacking areas used by both sides throughout the game.

The attacking area percentages utilised by both sides (source: Perth Glory Football Club)

City went through the middle on more occasions throughout the game than the Glory, but what was clear was that the majority of their attacking areas were utilised in a mostly balanced manner.

Clearly there would be favoured sides, as the Glory preferred attacking down the right while City down the left.

So on the occasions were the Glory were able to penetrate the front third pressing structure of Melbourne City, usually due to one or two players passively defending, the Glory were quite slow to move the ball vertically.

Partly, this was due to the poor positioning of one of the midfielders, mostly Osama Malik, as Timmins would be willing to drop however the other would not occupy a higher position to create space. It just meant that Glory couldn’t dominate possession as there was next to no balance in the possession structure.

Up until around the 2:57 mark of the first half, the ball was essentially stuck in the Glory’s defensive third due to an inability to progress the ball either around, through or over City’s front third pressure.

What improved quite clearly under Ruben Zadkovich from when former coach Richard Garcia was in charge, was a slightly better rest-defence structure.

Often the Glory would be caught in defensive transition due to minimal numbers in pre-determined defensive positions.

However in this game, the priority was to ensure roughly 3 or 4 players were in defensive positions should City launch a counter attack.

Perth, to their credit, were able to contain the situation by remaining centrally compact and forcing Andrew Nabbout to attempt a low probability shot from a wider position on the right.

Joseph Forde, who was one of the players introduced under Zadkovich, played a crucial role in Perth’s first goal which occurred just under 5 minutes into the game.

Glory were under pressure as the ball made its way to Liam Reddy who dinked the ball out wide to Forde. The left-back kept his cool, flicked the ball over Andrew Nabbout and found Mitch Oxborrow.

I assume this pattern of play was worked on leading in to the City game, as the moment the ball went to Oxborrow and he got his head up, the players immediately started making forward runs in behind.

The midfielder played a wonderful diagonal switch to Burke-Gilroy who was able to isolate his defender, to give time for some support to arrive.

Burke-Gilroy’s options

There were options for the makeshift right winger, and he chose the option to go down the line, cut the ball back and fortunately, Callum Timmins was able to make up considerable ground and curled the ball into the top left corner.

Zadkovich knew, as did mostly everyone coming into this game, that the only way the Glory were going to be able to cause problems for Melbourne City was through quick offensive transitions.

The goal was a product of exactly that. I mentioned earlier that the Glory had some luck in front of goal and for this strike it was the case, as it registered an xG of 0.03, which in more simple terms means, it’s a goal that was scored from a very unlikely position.

From that goal onwards, the Glory essentially turned into a prime Atletico Madrid side; compact, low block, 4–4–2, aggression.

It’s more than fair to suggest that the City players were initially rattled by the goal, as they came into this game against a very depleted Perth Glory side as heavy favourites.

There were similarities in certain moments between how City and Perth pressed.

When organised, Perth had a compact 4–4–2 block, with Mitch Oxborrow tasked with acting as a screen — cutting out the passing lane to Rostyn Griffiths and Burke-Gilroy encouraging a ball to be played to the ball-side fullback.

Glory’s pressing structure

Callum Timmins was pretty crucial for the Glory in the game, not just through the goals he scored, but his work on and off the ball.

When it came to evading City’s press, the Glory players had to utilise quick ball movement as well as players willing to progressively carry the ball.

In one situation, Reddy dinked the ball to Rawlins who chose to be positive and attack his defender. What this created was space for Callum Timmins to receive and thus expand the Glory’s attack.

Rawlins driving with the ball, creating space for Timmins to receive

Timmins is a reasonably press-resistent midfielder, which allows him to protect or drive with the football, which was crucial for the Glory’s success in the game.

He essentially broke through two challenges from City players, and this allowed for Mitch Oxborrow to receive the ball in space.

Oxborrow receiving in space

The key when breaking a Melbourne City press is to have players that are positive on the ball and positionally disciplined. Oxborrow holding his positioned allowed for him to receive in space, as Timmins’ pass took out 7 City players who were in close proximity.

Perth could’ve exploited this if they were more disciplined when in possession, but nevertheless they got the win in the end.

What also contributed massively to the Glory’s win was their defensive organisation, mostly in their defensive third.

More often than not, the back four and midfield two would drop as far back as the 18 yard box, to ensure the City players had minimal avenues to goal.

It was often made almost impossible for City to test the Glory’s goal given the high volume of Perth defenders occupying deep positions in the box.

Perth’s very deep block

City found it very difficult to penetrate the Perth block from central positions, as they moved very well when the ball was shifted and they ensured players that wanted to receive in those dangerous positions were closesly marked.

I think it’s more than fair to suggest that the City players from a psychological perspective found it very difficult to break Perth down. Often their frustration was visible as was their lack of discipline when receiving the ball in dangerous areas. Their decision making was quite poor.

It wasn’t until added time just before the first half concluded where they had their best opportunity, yet it was a fantastic save by Liam Reddy to deny Rostyn Griffiths from the corner.

Despite City’s high number of shots, the xG of a large portion of them were well below 0.20, indicating that their shooting was below par or they were taken from poor locations.

One of their best chances occurred in the 89th minute via Jamie Maclaren and based on the xG (0.12, however an xGTOT of 0.65), it probably should’ve been a goal.

Maclaren’s shot

Given the statistical likelihoods of many of City’s chances, it’s more than reasonable to suggest the Glory defended extremely well.

Even in the above example, Jacob Muir did just enough to put one of the league’s best strikers off and caused Maclaren’s shot to be quite tame.

Of course, luck was more on the Glory’s side than with City and this was evident with Timmins’ second goal.

The shot was extremely fortunate to have gone in, given the shot location, xG of 0.05 and Tom Glover’s blunder. However, the build-up play was surprisingly high level from the Glory.

What was a clear contrast from Ruben Zadkovich’s style of play to Richard Garcia’s was the shift in tempo.

Under Zadkovich, the players attempted to play with speed and quick passes, with the intention of overloading sides to isolate, a common principle used by many top teams.

In the example below, Colli was able to receive in the half-space and turn. Notice Callum Timmins, who was unmarked.

Colli receiving the ball, Timmins by himself

The positioning of the midfielders was much better as the game progressed, as Malik was a deeper option who could shift the point of attack.

What made life difficult for City, was whenever a player like Callum Timmins would drive at them with speed. The Glory had many players making forward runs in behind, which made defending a real challenge.

Timmins driving with the ball

Not long after that dribble, Timmins launched a missile into the bottom left corner, that was aided massively by Tom Glover’s error.

Concluding Thoughts

(image source: Getty Images)

I still have pretty big doubts over whether Ruben Zadkovich will be able to coach the Glory to success over the next few years, however the solitary game against Melbourne City showed that the 36-year-old can organise his side to effectively exploit an opposition’s weak areas.

The ability to be prolific in transition, defend in a low block that is compact and organised, manipulate the ball with speed and play with a great sense of stoic determination, are very good indicators of what this team could be under Zadkovich.

Despite having one of the most depleted A-League sides in recent memory, the tactical organisation of Zadkovich’s Glory was quite impressive with all circumstances considered.

Patrick Kisnorbo could argue that his side were hard done by given the amount of chances his team had, but upon reflection, a large portion of those chances were wasteful or statistically unlikely to score.

--

--

James Renton

Perth Glory, Manchester United. Analysis, tactics and opinions.