Ole Gunnar Solskjær’s Caretaker Period
Introduction
Manchester United following José Mourinho’s dismissal during the 2018/19 season were in a really bad state. Players were not playing anywhere near their full capabilities, embarrassing results were the norm, the playing style was atrocious and overall, there was a poisonous atmosphere at the club.
At the time, United’s short term solution was to bring in a sense of positivity and optimism from a legend of the club in Ole Gunnar Solskjær. Again, looking short term, this solution would look to work as the players needed a lift. What followed was incredible.
From December 2018 to March 2019, Manchester United recorded 14 wins, 2 draws and 3 losses, where Solskjær won his first 8 games in charge. This led United to averaging 2.46 points per game. In his 19 games as caretaker boss, United had 239 attempts on goal for an average of 12.6 per match, scoring 40 while only conceding 17 goals.
Young forwards in Marcus Rashford and Anthony Martial were on fire, Paul Pogba was given license to create and be free, and even Luke Shaw, who was brutally criticised by the previous management on a number of occasions, played incredibly well.
Of course, a lot of United’s wins came against lower end sides in Bournemouth and Cardiff City, however there were important wins that occurred against big clubs like PSG, Tottenham, Arsenal and Chelsea. Particularly against PSG, Manchester United arguably had their best performance of the season, which inevitably gave Ole the job.
Starting Lineup
Solskjær showed early signs of tactical flexibility, as he demonstrated successful use of the following systems during his caretaker period;
- 4–3–3
- 4–2–3–1
- 4–3–1–2
For me, Ole’s best lineup was this (in the 4–3–3 system);
De Gea
Young — Lindelöf — Smalling — Shaw
Herrera — Matić — Pogba
Lingard — Rashford — Martial
The fluctuation in the systems was either to compensate for injuries/rotation or to give Paul Pogba more freedom in advanced positions, where he could create and dictate the game. It was often seen a bit later on in his tenure that Pogba would be deployed as a number 10 in order for that freedom to occur.
Build Up Play
In the early stages of his caretaker period, Solskjær was yet to face any of the big six sides, which resulted in United averaging 67% in possession — a statistic that was nowhere near associated with former manager, José Mourinho, where the average hovered around 50%.
When United would line up in a 4–2–3–1, the structure in midfield would include a double pivot of Matić and Herrera (or Fred on occasion) acting as the base with Pogba in more advanced positions acting as either an 8 or a 10 on the left hand side.
A key trait that Solskjær has encouraged with his players, in particular his CBs, is for them to advance further with the ball — another characteristic not seen under Mourinho. This tactical change allowed for defender Victor Lindelöf to flourish, as his dribbling and passing range was put on full display.
For instance, there was a sequence against Cardiff City when Lindelöf advanced all the way from CB through all of Cardiff’s team and a goal almost occurred as a result.
The Swede’s partner, usually either Chris Smalling or Phil Jones, would advance with the ball, however their passing range was limited to often finding the safe option, generally a player close by.
The passing was also more brave under Solskjær than Mourinho, as players were more reluctant to play progressive and potentially risky passes, and would often instead go long and look for Romelu Lukaku. Solskjær changed this idea completely, as the sequence above involved Lindelöf utilising his passing ability to play a line breaking pass to Paul Pogba, who could receive on the half turn and play.
This also gave Pogba the opportunity to receive in between the lines, as shown above, instead of having to drop deep to the defenders. With the Frenchman receiving in between the lines, he too could show his passing range, as it often gave United the platform to play at a very quick tempo.
The fullbacks were also given greater license to advance into more attacking positions. Under Mourinho, the fullbacks often wouldn’t advance with the ball in attacking areas, due to Mourinho’s perception of this idea being risky caused by the space left behind by an advancing fullback.
You would often see the fullbacks getting into very advanced positions, particularly on the right hand side with Ashley Young almost becoming a right winger. This idea came about as at the time, United didn’t have a pure right winger, as Lingard would often come inside to play as a creative midfielder.
The fullbacks advancing was often the result of Nemanja Matić dropping in between the CBs to create a back 3 but also creating a 3v2 advantage whenever teams tried to press with 2 strikers.
Most of United’s passing was often on the ground, and this was the product of the forwards playing narrow and in central areas.
On goal kicks, the approach was more conservative, with David de Gea going long, often wide in the direction of Marcus Rashford. This approach avoided any risky pressure being put on the players when building up the play.
Attacking Play
Under Solskjær, this was the area where United were the most damaging. But in order to give the attacking players freedom, Ole made sure to implement a suitable rest defence structure that will allow the fullbacks in particular to advance into advanced positions.
Particularly when United played in the 4–2–3–1 system, the double pivot, whether it is Matić, Herrera or Fred, would often be in positions to cover the fullbacks.
Freedom of movement was a common feature during Solskjær’s caretaker period, as he drew upon inspiration from Sir Alex Ferguson allowing his players to be fluid and interchange positions. This was used to a good effect under Solskjær, although there was a tendency for most of the attacks to be going down the left hand side of the pitch.
The players being narrow and in tight spaces allowed for intricate and quick one/two touch passing. This was often key in breaking down the defensive shapes of many of the lower end sides.
One of the objectives under Ole was to have that movement, predominantly with the front three in order to create space in between the lines for players to receive. Jesse Lingard in particular benefited from this, as he was able to drift into very dangerous positions on a number of occasions.
Another interesting feature that Solskjær looked to implement was the players utilising the half spaces on a more frequent basis. As it is arguably the best area to create damaging chances that are more likely to result in goals, United have often sought out this space on numerous occasions.
What was also noticeable during Solskjær’s caretaker period was the fact that there were less crosses per game. Under Mourinho, United would average 15 crosses per game, most of which coming to no avail. However under Ole, only 9.5 crosses are averaged per game. This shows the clear contrast in approach between the two managers from a chance creation perspective.
Instead, looking to play short and penetrative passes are the key. Again, I spoke about the utilisation of the half space under Solskjær. Consider this example below:
Under Mourinho, the action that would most likely happen would be a cross. However, there are only 4 United players present in the box against 5 Cardiff City defenders, so it’s likely the cross would not have worked.
However, what followed from this image was Pogba finding Jesse Lingard in the half space. The following objective here is to engage in tight interplay with either Martial, Shaw or Pogba to try and pull out the Cardiff City defenders and exploit space in between the lines or in behind.
Another contrastable change under Solskjær, was the higher number of sprints/efforts done by the players. In terms of distance covered and sprints and all of the similar statistics as a result, under Mourinho, United were one of the lowest ranked in the league.
But under Ole, it was clear that there was a greater emphasis on all of the players looking to put in that extra effort in order to benefit the team in an attacking situation. Solskjær even said it when he was Permanent Manager, that he wants his side to be the hardest working in the league. It showed to an extent especially against Cardiff.
So pairing the exploitation of the half spaces and doing so with speed is how United would mainly create their chances during Ole’s caretaker period. Take Martial’s goal against Cardiff City. Tight interplay in and amongst the right half space, as well as some speed and directness on the Frenchman’s end, so a beautifully constructed goal and a superb finish.
All of the passing in that sequence was one touch. The Cardiff defenders had no idea on how to stop it, as they were getting ripped apart following United’s new and modernised approach. Teams would try and force United towards their own half by overloading the left half space (United’s favoured half space to exploit). But this often achieved little to no effect, as there would be space in behind for one of the forwards to exploit.
Of course, during the early periods of Ole’s caretaker spell, Manchester United were heavily aided by many of their opposition’s lack of defensive awareness and structure when it came to trying to protect the left half space. But huge credit has to be given to the players, as their intelligence, movement and passing created a high number of chances.
Paul Pogba
There will always be talk about Paul Pogba and how good he can be, with his consistency being an issue. But under Solskjær, particularly during the caretaker spell, Pogba was consistent and found a level that hadn’t been seen in a very long time. It was no secret that during Mourinho’s tenure, Pogba was inconsistent and the pair had a very frosty relationship.
In order to try and get Pogba to influence the game more, Mourinho would deploy him in deep positions. However, this saw inconsistency with the Frenchman’s performances. So when Solskjær was appointed, he looked to put Pogba into areas where he could have more influence over how the games would pan out.
By deploying Pogba as either an advanced central midfielder on the left or as a number 10, Pogba was able to create a higher number of chances, both coming from assists and goals on his end. What was clear under Solskjær, was that Pogba was more free, energised and motivated to create play. This was often seen by the midfielder advancing at speed with the ball.
Ole encouraged Pogba to make more runs and movements into higher positions, and to mostly receive in between the lines. This was really useful when United were in possession and were looking to progress the ball into advanced areas.
It was clear that under Solskjær, he saw Pogba as his main creator and the stats show that. During the caretaker spell. In the first 20 goals scored under Solskjær’s caretaker period, Pogba was involved in 55% of them, scoring 6 goals and assisting 5. With those 11 goals that he had an impact with, he was involved in more league goals in Europe’s top five leagues than any other player at the time.
I mentioned earlier about Solskjær increasing the importance of Pogba making advanced movements in order to affect the play more. When United elected to cross the ball, the Frenchman would often make a late run into the box. Due to his physique and aerial ability, not many defenders could cope with him in the box, as he often comes in un-tracked.
Marcus Rashford
Under Solskjær’s caretaker period, we saw Marcus Rashford hit an incredible level. Under both Mourinho and Louis van Gaal, it was unclear what the Englishman’s best position was. So Solskjær looked to deploy Rashford as a striker but with the freedom to move anywhere across the final third.
Rashford offers Solskjær something Lukaku doesn’t, runs at speed into the channels. One of Rashford’s best goals scored against Bournemouth was a result of a run into the wide right area. The phase of play began with Ashley Young playing a long ball into space, with Rashford running on as Nathan Ake was in close proximity.
Under Solskjær, it was clear that he encouraged the players, particularly the offensive players to try things and be creative. Rashford found himself in a 1v1 situation against Ake, attempted an elastico that came off, beat another man, delivering a wicked ball into the box and Pogba scored as a result.
Another impressive element of Rashford’s movement was also the signs of maturity that comes with being a number 9. When he scored his goal against Bournemouth, he saw the space but didn’t go immediately. He waited for the right moment and with a quick burst of speed he exploited the space following a brilliant cross from Anthony Martial.
Rashford was instrumental during Solskjær’s caretaker period, scoring 6 goals and assisting twice.
United’s defensive efforts
Manchester United’s ability to retain possession was made easier due to the players counterpressing every time possession was lost. Under Mourinho, counterpressing was rarely seen but during Solskjær’s caretaker period it was frequent.
The counterpressing is aided massively as a result of the United players looking to operate in shorter and tight spaces, which allows them to converge on an opposition player very quickly following possession being lost.
It wasn’t just a counterpress for one effort, there were multiple waves of pressure. Pogba was unsuccessful with his counterpress, however Ander Herrera was focused and alert, as he immediately followed up to apply pressure to Ecuele Manga’s first short passing option.
What followed was Herrera being even more aggressive and determined to win the ball, that he went on to tackle Ecuele Manga successfully.
What was evident under Solskjær’s caretaker period was that there was an immediate attitude switch every time possession was lost, as the players showed a real hunger and attitude to win the ball back as soon as they lost it. For instance against Cardiff, there was an incredibly high number of ball recoveries made in the midfield and attacking thirds.
Solskjær may or may not have taken inspiration from Jürgen Klopp, however the moment when United win the ball following a counterpress, they look to counter attack as soon as possible. This often led to a number of good chances created, as many teams were not organised the moment they won the ball off United.
Manchester United’s pressing game in general under Ole Gunnar Solskjær’s caretaker period was impressive. They were brave and pressed high with a lot of energy. United would look to overload the ballside and win the ball back in a wide area.
When United would press in their 4–2–3–1 shape, they looked really difficult to break down, as the opposition would try and pass their way through United, only to find that it would end up going nowhere, as the short passing options would be dealt with very quickly, particularly when the ball went wide.
With Marcus Rashford often leading the charge during a press, many of the opposition players would be afraid to try building from the back due to Rashford’s speed, as this forced many mistakes and turnovers.
Forcing the ball long is what United would also want, due to the aerial ability they would have with their defenders, as Smalling, Young and Shaw in particular were good enough in the air to challenge a long ball.
When Manchester United would defend in a medium block, they would do so in a 4–2–3–1 shape. This is due to the central compactness the shape offers, as well as the positioning of the forward players should the ball be won back immediately.
When the ball was out wide, it was imperative for the defenders to not let the attackers come inside. United would press in an aggressive manner in order to force this situation to happen.
The wingers would have to track back in order to assist the fullback and not leave them isolated.
In more central areas, the midfielders would assist with covering the fullbacks.
Conclusion
Under Ole Gunnar Solskjær during his caretaker period, it was clear that many of the players were playing at their best. The young players were blossoming, the big players were performing at a high level and United as a team looked like the Manchester United of old again.
