José Mourinho Analysis
Introduction
If you had to ask me who one of my all time favourite managers in football is, one of the answers I would give you is José Mourinho. Now, over the last few years he has probably been the victim of his own success and over time he probably hasn’t adapted as well to the modern game as he could have, although currently with new club AS Roma, Mourinho’s side is sitting 4th, only two wins away from 1st.
While his current form may not be as pleasing as most would’ve expected, his journey in football is incredible and the success that has followed him wherever he goes, has been phenomenal. Unlike many managers in today’s game, Mourinho was not a professional footballer. He began as a PE teacher at a school in Portugal for a few years. After spells working as an assistant manager and a youth team coach with various clubs in Portugal, in 1992 he became an translator for Sir Bobby Robson when he got a job at Sporting Club Portugal.
He followed Robson to Porto in 1993. The relationship developed with Jose Mourinho learning from Bobby Robson led to Robson increasingly trusting the ideas of the young Mourinho, as Robson was very impressed by the level of tactical detail that Mourinho would put when doing tactical appreciations.
When Robson went to Barcelona in 1996, Mourinho followed, learning Catalan and becoming an important part of the set up. When Robson left, Mourinho wanted to go with him but Robson encouraged him to stay on, working for Dutchman Louis van Gaal in a successful two year period for the Spanish giants.
Following his spell at Barcelona, Mourinho wanted to give managing his own team a go, beginning in 2000, where he was offered the job at one of the biggest clubs in Portugal, S.L. Benfica. However, this was short-lived and in 2001, he left for União Desportiva de Leiria, who with Mourinho in charge were able to make incredible progress up the league table.
In 2002, he was selected to coach Porto, and using innovative scientific methods, including his famous Tactical Periodisation theory, he helped Porto to unprecedented success: including league titles, cup title, the UEFA cup (2002/03) and the UEFA Champions League (2003/04).
This success at Porto he carried to Chelsea, when he was appointed as their manager in late 2004. I think as supporters of the modern game, we were all intrigued into Chelsea but more specifically Mourinho where his first press conference really established him on the world stage.
“Please don’t call me arrogant because what I say is true. I’m European Champion so I’m not one of the bottle. I think I’m a special one.”
This legendary quote then set the platform for José Mourinho to explode. What followed was six trophies including two Premier League trophies, two League Cups, one FA Cup and one FA Community Shield.
His success followed him when he went to Inter Milan, where he won the Italian Treble with them and then with Real Madrid, where he broke countless records but more importantly, broke Barcelona’s dominance in Spanish football.
He returned to England a different man but still successful. He won the Premier League again with Chelsea, as well as the League Cup. Unfortunately, he was sacked midway through his third season. When he was then appointed as manager at Old Trafford, I was excited as a fan of United, because of Mourinho’s CV and the fact that he won the league everywhere he went.
He never really performed as well as he could, for me, despite winning three trophies (the Europa League, Community Shield and the League Cup) albeit they were all won in his first season. Two seasons of almosts, but mostly toxicity followed which led him to another dismissal at a top club.
Tottenham was interesting. Interesting in the sense that he would go from us to a club that hadn’t won major silverware in years. It was a fraction confusing. Of course there was optimism, as he really helped with improving key players like Harry Kane and Son Heung-Min but ultimately wasn’t successful with winning any trophies. In 2021, he was dismissed.
Tactical Periodisation
Tactical Periodisation is a football training methodology developed roughly 36 years ago by Vítor Frade, a sports science professor from Porto University in Portugal. Since its creation, it has become one of the most widely adopted and implemented training methodologies worldwide.
The methodology is derived from the study of different sciences and inter-disciplines that apply to football, including neuroscience, theory of complexity, chaos theory, systems theory, physiology, psychology, fractal geometry, and sociology. In all these aspects considered, the game of Football is viewed in a holistic perspective, maintaining its complex identity. (Oliveira G. in Farias, 2016)
When it comes to breaking down the methodology to its core principles, as the name would suggest, the tactical dimension is the overarching dimension of the Football game and the physical, technical and psychological dimensions exist within this tactical dimension.
* Note that this is different to other representations of tactical periodisation, as the other representations have the dimensions in it’s separate category.
This methodology believed in training each of these dimensions separately, which challenges the traditional coaching application, not just in Football but in other sports.
José Mourinho was a very early strong supporter of this coaching methodology, and one of the first coaches to prove this methodology’s success. From 2002 to 2004, as manager of Porto, he had an immensely successful period. As I mentioned previously, this success followed him when he went to England, Italy and Spain, achieving significant domestic and European success.
While Mourinho is the most well known proponent of Tactical Periodization, this training methodology has also been adopted successfully, by many coaches that speak highly of Mourinho including André Villas-Boas, Brendan Rogers, Nuno Espírito Santo, Marco Silva, Carlos Carvalhal, Vitor Pereira, and Leonardo Jardim.
José Mourinho’s use of Tactical Periodisation
Thankfully, there are avenues online to research into how Mourinho used the Tactical Periodisation methodology to create his game model. The idea of a game model comes from the methodology, where it is described as a level of organisation that the team achieves in the game as a consequence of pre-determined behaviors that coaches want their players to adopt on each moment of the game and in different situations.
Mourinho liked the idea of a game model in particular, as he said that his idea of a team was, “one where in a certain moment, faced with a certain situation, all of the players think in the same way.”
The Game Model was where the idea of the four moments of the game came from;
- Offensive Organisation
- Defensive Transition
- Defensive Organisation
- Attacking Transition
José said in an interview with Coaches’ Voice, that in order for a team to be successful, they have to be strong in all four of those moments. There was no use in being the best at defending (Defensive Organisation) when you need to attack and score goals (Offensive Organisation).
Within each moment of the game, Mourinho would have a
- Principle
- Objective to pursue by the Team
- Few detailed Sub Principles
Offensive Organisation
At this moment of the game, Mourinho’s principle is ball possession and circulation. Within this principle is the objective of looking to de-organise and unbalance the opposition’s defensive structure, with the intention of creating and taking advantage of spaces that will allow his teams to score goals.
The sub-principles present with this principle are good positional game lines, that are either transverse or longitudinal, triangles and diamonds as well as diagonal lines of pass. He also wants to privilege the ball circulation, instead of transporting it (favours passing more instead of dribbling). The final sub-principle, is alternating the type of pass (short or long), and the zone that is penetrated as a result of the pass.
Mourinho when building possession wasn’t fussed about playing tight and intricate short passing sequences to break possession. Rather, if he had the necessary skills and qualities available within his squad, he would look to unbalance the opposition’s organisation by going long to a target man striker like Zlatan Ibrahimović, Romelu Lukaku or more recently Harry Kane.
This example above was a common pattern of play, going long to the target man which bypasses the opposition’s first and/or second line of pressure. From there, the plan is either for the striker to bring the ball to ground for the more technically gifted players or flicking it on to the advantage of a quick winger.
A lot of the time with Mourinho’s teams, particularly in the latter stages of his career, he’s in ways rejected the need and use of play created from deep, which is why in most situations his teams look long to avoid this area of the game.
When the ball was in the midfield and attacking thirds, this was where his teams would be the most effective and damaging. Speed has always been associated with José’s sides, no matter the club although the execution of these actions varies depending on the quality of players available.
In the All or Nothing documentary done by Amazon focussing on Mourinho’s side at Tottenham, there was a scene where he spoke about the need to play a “fast ball into the space”. Against Southampton in the FA Cup, they were able to execute this idea to perfection, with a goal the resulting action.
When it came to the final third, the speed of a Mourinho attack would be in full effect. Often, the main source of chance creation would be via a very hard and low driven cross to the advantage of an attacker. Cristiano Ronaldo’s goal against Manchester United in the 2012/13 Champions League Round of 16 second leg, was a beautiful example of this action.
Defensive Transition
The core principle in this phase is pressure over the ball and closer spaces. In this phase, Mourinho wants his teams to take advantage of the disorganisation of the opponents’ transition to attack or for the team to organise the team defensively.
This idea is not overly present in many big games, as with a Mourinho side, they look to take a more conservative approach in defense, where pressing is limited to their own half. So what he does instead, is he looks to organise the team defensively and set up their shape.
However these points are quite relevant for attacking based teams, as teams such as Liverpool look to take advantage of the disorganisation of the opponent, or much simply they look to counter press them to avoid being counter attacked.
Some of Mourinho’s sub-principles include:
A change of attitude, which he refers to as a click
- where the players (should the situation arise) would look to change to a “pressing and aggressive” attitude
Mourinho wants aggressiveness over the ball with intelligence and lucidity
- the players shouldn’t get too close or knock down the opposition or try and take over the ball without cover from other teammates
The final sub-principle was for the team to close the team lines immediately.
Generally, Mourinho would want to press aggressively if the ball was out in wide areas and remain slightly passive when the ball is in the middle, in order to retain compactness.
But more often than not, particularly in big games it would be looking to get into their shape ASAP. Looking to retain their defensive structure and not looking to give any space in the middle are aspects that Mourinho demands from his defenders.
Defensive Organisation
Probably the phase that is the equal most recognisable when people describe Mourinho’s strengths tactically. Mourinho’s principle is to press zonally, but with man-orientations. It’s a different kind of pressing strategy, but over time it has worked for him.
In this marking style, Mourinho would usually play his 4–2–3–1 system in which the reference point for the press is the “opponent.” From their respective base positions, the players orient themselves flexibly in the space they cover in order to maintain a certain distance to the opponent closest to them.
The contrast to man-marking is clear, where in a man-oriented press, a player sticks very close to his opponent, oftentimes even tracking just the one opponent. In zonal marking, a player must cover the space around his position, loosely moving his position to any nearby opponent and staying close to them.
In a way, it’s a compromise between position-oriented zonal marking and man-marking. The advantage over man-marking is fewer open holes. The advantage over position-oriented zonal marking is the increased access gained via the shorter distance to the opposition.
But what is more common with this moment of the game is José Mourinho’s Bus. This expression was used to describe his means to play very defensively, by getting a lot of players behind the ball, to offer no attacking play. Like, imagine a bus parked in front of the goal. It’s almost impossible to score.
This tactic is used mostly in very big games, as Mourinho doesn’t want to sacrifice space for the opponents to exploit. It’s a pessimistic attitude, but one that would often get him results, which at the end of the day is all that he wants.
José’s bus has taken a few forms over the years. But generally, the application of when it was used, was to protect a one goal lead or to restrict the opposition’s momentum due to the possession they were having in dangerous areas.
Probably the most famous use of this strategy was when Mourinho’s Inter Milan went to the Camp Nou for the second leg of the Champions League Semi Finals in 2010. Inter came to Barcelona with a 3–1 lead, however losing Thiago Motta to a highly questionable red card after 28 minutes, Mourinho basically instructed his side to batten down the hatches and defend for their lives. It was dogged, but Inter came away with a 1–0 loss, which was just enough for them to qualify for the final.
If Mourinho was particularly wary of the threat that the opposition’s forwards had, then it wouldn’t be a surprising feature seeing the wingers dropped as wingbacks and the team then defending with a back six. This was used frequently by Manchester United in the 2017/18 season against Liverpool, with the home side only allowed 5 from 19 shots on target.
Offensive Transition
This along with Mourinho’s bus parking, was the moment of the game that many people remember José for. The key principle here is assuring ball possession. The objective here is to take advantage of the defensive organisation of the opposition to create goal scoring opportunities or to start their offensive organisation.
It is pretty safe to say that Mourinho favours counter attacks the moment he wins the ball — this is what he means by taking advantage of the defensive disorganisation of the opponents. Simply, he wants his team to capitilise on the fact that the opponents have not set up, which should, in theory, result in a higher chance of a goal scoring opportunity.
Some sub principles that are present within this moment of the game are:
- Getting the ball out of the pressing zone
Deciding between:
- Looking to counter attack a disorganised opposition unit
- Stabilising possession and transitioning into Offensive Organisation
Again, this elaborates on the idea of the opponents being disorganised. What he means by getting the ball out of the pressing zone, is to not have it anywhere near the goal, perhaps out wide. This can allow the players the time to make those two decisions.
The situation of the game will result in which option is chosen (eg. If the team is 1–0 down with 20 minutes to go, they will most likely choose the first option, as it is a risk but it should allow for a quick break, while the team is disorganised).
During his time particularly with Real Madrid and Manchester United, both of those teams were able to execute counter attacks incredibly, with tremendous pace and often a goal scored. When defining counter attacks, there are three areas where they would occur; when possession is won in the defensive third, middle third and the attacking third.
Usually, when a Mourinho side counter attacks, it will begin with a player powerfully dribbling with the ball forward, as shown above. This was to draw the opposition players who were in rest defence out of position. This is to give the quicker players more space and time to really exploit the space left by the opposition.
These counter attacks from deeper positions would be ideal against possession based sides, as they would commit many players forward and with Mourinho instructing the attacking players (should the situation allow itself to come to fruition) to stay in advanced positions, the opposition would find it almost impossible to defend.
On the occasions when Mourinho would instruct his sides to press, if the opposition did not have sufficient depth behind the ball when building up play in their defensive third, the potential for them to be ruthlessly punished was so high, with the aggressive tackle from a midfielder and a quick break from an attacker followed by a goal, being the most likely outcome.
It’s not just the dribbling or the pass that’s one of the most important aspects of a successful counter attack. Support horizontally, followed by a vertical run was paramount for a José Mourinho counter attack. Stretching the opposition defenders who are remaining followed by a run into space was the key to a successful counter attack.
The runs could be inverted or overlapped, but whatever it was, the paramount objective was to support the player in possession.
Conclusion
While Mourinho has had somewhat of a downfall in recent years, this comes from his incredibly high standards that he commands as a manager. It will only be a matter of time until success finds José again.
Although I’m not a complete fan of Mourinho to not point out that he needs to adapt slightly to the modern game, whether it is player treatment or slight tactical adjustments, particularly in the Defensive and Offensive Organisation phases.
But what can’t be changed is the success he’s achieved over a long period of time. He deserves the respect he’s asking for.
