A Post-Mortem Of Perth Glory’s Defensive Struggles
The Perth Glory has certainly had its share of challenges this season, and as preparations for the next one kick into high gear, one glaring issue stands out: our defensive organisation.
It’s no secret that the team’s backline has struggled, conceding a staggering 69 goals in just 27 games. However, delving into the reasons behind this defensive vulnerability is key to understanding the root of the problem.
Analysing shot locations can offer valuable insights into a team’s defensive performance. As an example, let’s dive into Wellington’s data to see where their opponents have been taking shots and how effective they’ve been.
The Phoenix’s defensive prowess this season stands out prominently, particularly when examining their remarkable goal differential compared to their Expected Goals Against (xGA) — an unprecedented feat in A-League history. Despite facing a substantial total of 496 shots over the season, what’s truly remarkable is the significant variance between the expected goals conceded and the actual goals conceded.
This is evidenced by their xGA differential of 14.4, which is the best recorded in any A-League season. While Wellington may allow a considerable number of shots, their defensive strategy effectively limits the quality of these chances.
For instance, only 28% of the shots they faced were on target, representing the lowest rate in the A-League this season. This statistic underscores their ability to restrict the opposition to less threatening opportunities, ultimately contributing to their outstanding defensive performance and their historic xG differential.
Now, when compared with the Glory’s defensive performance, it’s quite clear that Glory have been pretty lax with their efforts.
When we compare the defensive performances of the Glory and Wellington from this past season, a clear discrepancy in effectiveness emerges.
This graphic highlighted a concerning pattern for Alen Stajcic’s side throughout the season, as there’s a noticeable clustering of shots in areas with high Expected Goals (xG), particularly around the penalty box. Despite facing fewer shots than Wellington, Perth’s defence struggled to thwart opponents from creating high-value scoring opportunities.
The statistics further underscore this disparity.
40% of the shots the Glory faced were on target, a rate significantly higher than Wellington’s. On average, they conceded 7.11 shots on target per game, indicating a consistent vulnerability in defence. Moreover, with an average of 1.99 xG against per game, opponents were frequently presented with promising chances to score, as evidenced by the high xG per shot of 0.11.
In simpler terms, Perth Glory’s defensive performance this past season was undeniably subpar.
I spoke with Petar Petrov, a Football Scout and Recruitment Analyst, who comprehensively assessed Perth Glory’s defensive challenges.
“The lack of screening in front of the back 4 or 5 is definitely one of the biggest (issues). There’s also not a single real #6 in that squad, bar (Luke) Bodnar, who hasn’t been given a chance. Add to that the unnecessary overcommitting of players to the front line and you get a recipe for disaster, especially when you don’t have quality. Oli Sail has been pretty bad as well. Dead last for goals prevented based on xG.”
Ultimately, these are issues that have been consistent since the start of the season and show that Head Coach Alen Stajcic and his coaching staff have a lot of work to do in the off-season.
For me, the meticulous attention to defensive detail that was once a hallmark of the club under former head coach Tony Popovic has seen a notable decline, not just this season but the past four. The departure from this defensive ethos has been concerning for some time and has had tangible repercussions on the team’s results this season in particular.
One way to see that quite clearly has been the passiveness from several Glory players when they’ve been defending in a block, usually in one just outside the box. Throughout the season, a recurring scenario has been the failure to track forward runners and apply adequate pressure on the ball carrier.
I’ve talked about this problem since Round Four after the loss away to the Western Sydney Wanderers, as the lack of attention to detail was glaringly obvious, with players seemingly switching off at critical moments, often repeating the same defensive lapses.
For instance, in our game against the Wanderers, an example of this was the below, as Lachie Brook was afforded ample time on the ball, allowing Tate Russell to exploit the space in behind our defensive line.
Despite the opportunity to prevent Russell’s run, Salim Khelifi failed to track back, resulting in a one-on-one situation against Glory keeper Cameron Cook.
If I was Stajcic, I would’ve been furious with Khelifi’s efforts there. A senior player not tracking his run, but even worse, not trying to make up for it and just letting the attacker run through can’t be acceptable.
This deficiency was further exploited by the Wanderers players, who capitalised on runs in behind our defence due to poor body positioning and a lack of pressure on the ball carrier.
Tate Russell alone had multiple opportunities in that half as a result of his unchecked runs. The trend continued, with Jack Clisby capitalising on a third-man run to open the scoring for the Wanderers, demonstrating our failure to heed early warnings.
I spoke about this issue in one of my pieces at the beginning of the year. Essentially, I highlighted that the Glory’s defensive organisation had been really below par and that it was quite disappointing to observe how easily teams could cut through us.
The below visualisation of Clisby’s goal shows how simple it was for the Wanderers to open the scoring in the game.
My disappointment only grew as similar defensive lapses persisted in subsequent matches, notably against the Brisbane Roar and the Central Coast Mariners.
For instance, in the match against the Roar, I found myself concerned once again as Louis Zabala found himself in a dangerous position with acres of space.
Who’s on him? Where’s the organisation and communication? The worst part was that there were 5 Glory players around the 2 Brisbane players, and not one of them was able to regain possession.
In other words, that was a great example of the old Under 5’s adage of “Seagull Soccer”.
While Zabala’s subsequent goal was ruled offside, it was indicative of a broader issue: our failure to learn from defensive mistakes and adequately track players occupying threatening positions in our defensive third.
Glory lost the game 2–1, and the goals we conceded were undeniably soft and sloppy.
Henry Hore’s goal, for example, stemmed from a well-timed run in behind our flat-footed defenders, leaving them unable to recover and allowing Hore to score from a tight angle. Similarly, Jay O’Shea’s goal highlighted our vulnerability to players left unmarked at the edge of the box, providing them with multiple opportunities to find the back of the net.
In the following game against Sydney FC, although the scoreline appeared somewhat more favourable with a narrow 3–2 loss, a closer examination of the numbers revealed a concerning ease with which the Sky Blues dominated.
Ufuk Talay’s side managed an alarming 33 shots, 13 of which were on target, resulting in a final xG of 3.19. The Sky Blues had 23 shots inside our box along with 9 big chances created, something that cannot happen for a team that has aspirations of playing finals football.
The first goal conceded by Glory was emblematic of a recurring issue I’ll elaborate on later in this piece: our pressing structure.
On numerous occasions, our two central midfielders have been caught too high up the pitch, contributing to a lack of overall compactness. This allows the opposition’s attacking players to receive in behind our midfield line and attack our defenders, with space to exploit.
Any analyst or coach would undoubtedly find cause for concern, as I assume Alen Stajcic did upon reviewing the game, especially when observing our team’s defensive setup.
Giordano Colli’s decision to step out and press only afforded Patrick Wood additional space to receive the ball, allowing him to penetrate an undermanned Glory defence. Sydney capitalised on this lapse in defensive organisation, unleashing three shots in the ensuing counterattack, culminating in Joe Lolley’s decisive strike.
This match showcased the Glory’s clear vulnerability from a defensive standpoint. A combination of players positioning themselves too high and a general carelessness in possession proved to be a recipe for disaster, particularly against Sydney’s swift transitions.
The 4–2 loss to the Central Coast Mariners underscored several recurring issues, as I’ve previously discussed. This included passive defending or overly aggressive pressing, along with a notable lack of intensity and desire to maintain a clean sheet and limit the opposition’s chances on goal.
In this encounter, the Glory conceded an xG of 4.28, an alarmingly high figure that highlights our inability to prevent opponents from creating quality scoring opportunities.
Several examples from the match illustrate this point vividly, as I’ve previously outlined in one of my earlier reviews on this platform, emphasising the defensive deficiencies evident in this game.
For instance, the image below highlights a few key issues such as a lack of pressure on the ball carrier and a failure to track the movement of a dangerous opposition player, Marco Túlio.
Similarly, another example echoes observations made during the Sydney game, with our midfield caught out of position, leading to the Mariners exploiting a similar method to breach our defensive line that was seen in the Wanderers loss in Round Four.
These examples serve as a stark reminder of the defensive errors that plagued the Glory throughout the season, with opposing teams ruthlessly capitalising on our shortcomings. The importance of factors such as body positioning, intensity, and supporting teammates, while basic, were areas a number of Glory players struggled to consistently perform at a high level.
The crux of the Glory’s defensive woes, as highlighted by Petar Petrov’s insights, often stemmed from midfield deficiencies. Throughout the season, the team consistently found themselves on the losing end of the midfield battle, a recurring issue that hindered defensive stability and overall team performance.
A point of contention that has been raised repeatedly is the underutilisation of Luke Bodnar in the squad.
This season, Bodnar’s absence from the starting lineup has been a source of frustration for many, myself included, prompting criticism of head coach Alen Stajcic’s team selection. Bodnar’s unique skill set as a specialist defensive midfielder would’ve made him a vital asset, particularly given the team’s lack of depth in that position.
Comparatively, Bodnar’s performance last season showcased his proficiency in crucial defensive metrics, notably in successful defensive actions per 90 and defensive duels. Of particular significance was his commendable success rate in defensive duels, engaging in a notable 8.17 defensive duels per 90, with a commendable 68.54% success rate.
It’s disappointing that Stajcic did not capitalise on Bodnar’s strengths more frequently, as his presence could have provided invaluable defensive cover alongside a player like Mustafa Amini.
Instead, Giordano Colli was entrusted with that role.
His performances have drawn criticism this season, some of which I believe was warranted, particularly regarding his suitability in a double-pivot system.
Colli’s overall defensive contributions this season have been subpar, particularly when compared to Amini.
While both players engage in a similar number of defensive duels per 90, Colli’s lower success rate in winning these duels, at 55.56%, underscores his defensive deficiencies. For context, Colli engaged in 8.23 defensive duels per 90, while Amini engaged in 8.4, boasting a higher success rate of 67%.
In my opinion, Colli’s shortcomings in defensive situations often stem from his inconsistent decision making with regard to pressing as well as his inadequate body positioning during defensive duels. These lapses have frequently left him flat-footed and susceptible to opponents accelerating past him, necessitating desperate recovery attempts.
Here’s an instance that showcases the midfielder’s vulnerability to being caught flat-footed, a common occurrence in several duels involving Colli. With his weight leaning towards his right and lacking the agility of being on his toes, Daniel Arzani easily accelerated past him, seizing the opportunity to unleash a shot on goal.
Ultimately, the head coach bears responsibility for the team’s midfield structure and player selection. The failure to adapt or integrate a player like Bodnar into the lineup, despite his potential to bolster defensive solidity and midfield control, warrants justified criticism.
In fairness to Colli, Stajcic’s insistence on the 3–1–6 shape when in possession has also posed challenges for the team, a sentiment echoed by Petar Petrov, who voiced clear concerns regarding the sheer number of players committed forward.
While Perth Glory under the 50-year-old head coach aspire to play a fast, direct, and attacking style of football, employing six players in advanced attacking positions while maintaining a rest-defence structure involving only two midfielders and the centre-backs, as Petrov pointed out, presents a potential recipe for disaster.
Thankfully, it hasn’t directly led to a significant increase in goals conceded, however, this tactical approach has often led to frenetic, end-to-end encounters reminiscent of basketball games.
The propensity for carelessness in possession under this system can be particularly perilous, especially when players are stretched high and wide, leaving them vulnerable to swift counterattacks by adept opponents like Sydney FC and, more recently, Western United.
For instance, in the last home game of the season against Western United, Johnny Koutroumbis found himself caught too high up the pitch, leaving the defence exposed.
This, combined with the team’s struggles to maintain possession effectively, provided Western United with an opportunity to capitalise. Pay close attention to Koutroumbis’ positioning and his direct opponent.
Abel Walatee’s ample time on the ball following Koutroumbis’ positional lapse allowed him to compose himself before finding the back of the net. This match was characterised by numerous defensive errors, culminating in a disappointing 4–3 loss for the Glory.
In summary, the Perth Glory encountered a plethora of defensive issues throughout this season, many of which have persisted since the campaign’s outset. Undoubtedly, Alen Stajcic and his coaching staff will prioritise rectifying our defensive structure over the off-season, a task that will likely involve reshaping player behaviour and habits.
Central to this will be addressing fundamental aspects such as body positioning, awareness, and concentration, while instilling a collective ethos of defensive intensity and determination.
Alen, over his career, has often spoken about his teams needing to show a level of fight and grit— a facet that was notable in the earlier stages of the season, but clearly absent towards the backend (likely due to contract talks).
The aim should not merely be to avoid conceding goals but to assert defensive dominance and create opportunities for attacking play. While a simple statement, the best teams can attack just as well as they can defend.
Moreover, bolstering the squad with high-quality signings is imperative.
Recent reports suggesting the potential return of players like Josh Risdon and Brandon O’Neill to the club are undoubtedly encouraging. Strengthening the backline and midfield positions could have a transformative effect on the Glory’s fortunes, potentially propelling us up the league standings with significant momentum.
